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Abstract This paper considers the importance of unification in the context of developing scientific theo-
ries. I argue that unifying hypotheses are not valuable simply because they are supported by multiple lines
of evidence. Instead, they can be valuable because they guide experimental research in different domains
in such a way that the results from those experiments inform the scope of the theory being developed. I
support this characterization by appealing to the early development of quantum theory. I then draw some
comparisons with discussions of robustness reasoning.
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1 Introduction
The idea of unification has a long and varied history in philosophy of science. Consider, for instance,
William Whewell’s discussion of the Consilience of Inductions, first introduced in his Novum Organon
Renovatum as part of his analysis of the structure of scientific reasoning. One important element in
the construction of a theory occurs through the “Colligation of Facts”, a process he called Induction
(Whewell, 1989, p. 138). The three steps of this process are (1) the selection of the idea, (2) construction
of the conception and (3) determination of the magnitudes. In contemporary terms, we might think of
these steps as analogous to those used when trying to characterize a particular phenomenon mathemati-
cally. This process warrants the name ‘Induction’ because, as Whewell argues, something new is added
when such a characterization occurs, namely, previously ascertained facts are linked by a new conception,
often a mathematical equation. For instance, multiple observations of the position of Mars are individual
facts, which were colligated into the single conception of an elliptical orbit. However, such an Induction
refers to merely one class of facts. A Consilience of Inductions occurs when an Induction obtained from
one class is found to apply to a different class of facts, even though the two previously seemed to be
unrelated. Whewell takes this to be a good indicator of probable truth. He says,
[T]he evidence in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more forcible character when it
enables us to explain and determine cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated
in the formation of our hypothesis. The instances in which this has occurred, indeed, impress us
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with a conviction that the truth of our hypothesis is certain. No accident could give rise to such an
extraordinary coincidence (1989, 153, emphasis in original).
Thus, he argues that when a hypothesis is able to explain or predict facts of a kind that were not used
in its generation, the evidence for that hypothesis is stronger than it was before on the grounds that it could
not be mere coincidence that two disparate phenomena are explained by the same hypothesis. Instead, it
is much more likely that the hypothesis does actually apply in some way to all the phenomena it explains.
There are several historical examples that seem to bear out this inference. For instance, consider New-
ton’s “Moon-test” in his Principia. Having already established that there is some force keeping planets in
their orbits around the Sun, and that this force is directed towards the center of the Sun, Newton goes on
to argue that a similar force keeps the moon in orbit around the Earth, and that this force is the same force
previously recognised as terrestrial gravity. To make this argument, Newton first argues that the force
maintaining the moon in its orbit is directed towards the earth. He then assumed a mean Earth-Moon
distance of 60 Earth radii. Now, to quote William Harper,
Newton’s assumption of 60 terrestrial semidiameters as the lunar distance, together with inverse-
square variation, makes the one-minute fall corresponding to the strength of this force at the lunar
distance exactly equal to the one-second fall corresponding to the increased strength this force
would have at the surface of the Earth (Harper, 2002, 182).
Thus, what we have is a force acting on the Moon directed towards the center of the Earth, whose
strength is equal to a force at the surface of the Earth that acts on all objects there, whose magnitude is
measured by a seconds pendulum. Newton then refers to his Rules of Reasoning in order to posit that
the two forces responsible for the two phenomena are one and the same. We observe here the idea of
unification: the force that we observe as the phenomenon of terrestrial gravity is able to account for the
observations of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, two phenomena which previously seemed unrelated.
While Whewell’s term ‘consilience’ is not widely used,1 the idea of unification has reappeared in the
literature in several manifestations, where a useful characterization can be given as follows: unification as
a feature of scientific theories or hypotheses refers to the ability of said theory or hypothesis to account
for multiple phenomena which, prior to the proposal of the unifying hypothesis, appeared to be unrelated.
The value of this feature has been analysed in several different ways, which can be grouped roughly into
two types. The first is drawn from the work of philosophers such as Philip Kitcher, who appealed to
the feature of unification in order to characterize and evaluate scientific explanations (1981; 1989). He
argued that science provides good explanations to the extent that its theories are able to account for a wide
range of phenomena. Thus, if explanation is taken to be a goal of science, so is unification. The degree
of unification of an explanation can thus contribute to the evaluation of its quality, and by extension, the
quality of the theory itself.
It is now arguably more common to find unification being discussed in the context of confirmation
and justification. This characterization can take one of a few forms, but what these accounts have in com-
mon is that they consider the feature to contribute in some way to the evidential support for the unifying
hypothesis or theory. One way that this is cashed out is in terms of a common cause, or a type of inference
to the best explanation. For example, Forster (1988) has argued that theories that unify phenomena can be
understood as cases where causes from different contexts are independently verifying one another, thus
gaining credibility.2 We also see unification discussed in the context of formal epistemology, where au-
thors such as Myrvold (2003, 2017), McGrew (2003), Helgeson (2013), and Schupbach (2005) explicate
the concept using a Bayesian framework to analyse the degree of support it provides to a theory.
Without doubt, I consider these discussions both interesting and useful for our understanding of unifi-
cation. However, I submit that our focus on these conceptions has caused us to undervalue a crucial aspect
1 However, see Forster (2010) for an analysis in contemporary physics specifically using Whewell’s notion of consilience.
2 Spohn (1994) has also discussed unification in relation to IBE and common cause.
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of unification in scientific inquiry. This is in its use as a strategy for guiding theory pursuit, especially
in the early stages of theory development when a fully consistent framework may not yet be available.
Due in part to a tendency to consider unification primarily in the context of more developed rather than
fledgling theories, its utility as a heuristic is often overlooked. In such cases, the value of a unifying hy-
pothesis is not necessarily that of its ability to explain phenomena, nor that it raises the likelihood that
the theory or hypothesis is true. Instead, unifying hypotheses can be valuable because they guide exper-
imental research in different domains in such a way that the results from those experiments contribute
to our understanding and formulation of the theory being developed. The unification strategy helps us to
pinpoint what must be retained in any subsequent theory by identifying elements that are common to the
different areas of inquiry, as well as delineating the domain of applicability of the theory.
We see a hint of this in Michel Janssen’s discussion of what he terms COI Stories, an acronym for com-
mon origin inferences, which he considers a subspecies of Inferences to the Best Explanation (Janssen,
2002). COIs arise out of what Janssen calls common-origin explanations, which are hypotheses or theo-
ries that tie together multiple phenomena. He believes that most COIs will be common-cause inferences,
in which some kind of causal structure is posited as being responsible for several phenomena. Of course,
the notion of ‘causal structure’ here is quite broad, possibly referring to some event or substance with
causal efficacy, or a causal structure or mechanism broadly construed. The latter could presumably in-
clude such things as physical laws described by some mathematical structure, and so does not restrict
such an inference to any particular account of causal relations. Janssen provides a detailed reconstruc-
tion of several historical COI stories, and shows that this kind of reasoning did contribute to scientists’
decisions to accept certain theories. He also concludes that “the reliance on COIs in . . . the context of
pursuit does not call for any general philosophical justification. The issue of the justification of COI as
a pattern of inductive inference only comes up in the context of persuasion,” (2002, 513). While I am
generally in agreement with this statement, I believe it would be helpful to focus more attention on the
role of unification in the former context. When we do so, we can see that the idea of a common origin
as explicated by Janssen is very similar to that of unification. However, we should characterize its role in
the “context of pursuit” not necessarily as an inference to the best explanation, but instead as a heuristic
to guide theory development.3
My characterization of unification as a guiding strategy for theory construction is similar to the kind
of reasoning found in discussions of robustness analysis and indeed, its bears some resemblance to ar-
guments that have been given in that context. In particular, philosophers who discuss robustness often
consider the process of developing a theory rather than evaluating it.4 However, there is an important dif-
ference in our focus. Those who are interested in robustness reasoning tend to be interested in the study
and description of a particular system or phenomenon that is represented by multiple models. Robustness
reasoning is a way of inferring that some contents of these models are correct, and thus representative of
the phenomenon under study. Unification, in my account, is meant to be a heuristic strategy for pursuit
that guides research in multiple domains.
The aim of this paper is to show that the trait of unification can be considered in terms of a heuristic
strategy rather than a justificatory feature by showing how it was operative in a particular historical
example. While there is much to be said on the topic of heuristics, in the context of this paper, I consider
a unifying hypothesis to have been used heuristically in the sense that it was used to solve problems in
different domains without a clear account of how and why it should be able to do so. While not denying
the importance of the justificatory role of unification, the heuristic conception has the advantage of being
able to account for the contribution of failed lines of inquiry to scientific theory development. The rest of
the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I show how a unifying hypothesis was used in the early
3 In recent talks, Janssen has characterized the force of a COI not as a legitimate inference to the truth of a theory, but as an
indicator that an idea is worth pursuing.
4 See Weisberg (2006), Trizio (2012), Nederbragt (2012), Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016) and Schupbach (Forthcoming) for
examples. Miyake (2015) discusses a related methodological technique of decomposition in the context of theory construction.
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developmental stages of quantum theory. In Section 3, I show how an emphasis on the process of theory
development rather than theory evaluation can help us to reconceptualize the role that unification can
play. This is accomplished by discussing how understanding unification as a tool for theory development
helps to actually define the theory under investigation. I then compare this analysis of unification with
analyses of robustness reasoning before making some concluding remarks.
2 Unification as a guide to theory pursuit: the quantum case study
One of the central assumptions in classical physics is the idea that energy is correctly described in contin-
uous terms. However, in the late nineteenth-century, various experiments and observations began to point
to the inadequacy of classical theories in accounting for certain phenomena. Max Planck’s introduction
of “energy elements” in 1900 as a way to recover the behaviour of blackbody radiation was a ground-
breaking step, and was followed by other applications of the idea of quantized, or discretized, amounts
of energy by scientists in diverse contexts. However, there was certainly no well-developed, consistent
theory that could account for all of these anomalous observations. Indeed, it was this work that led to
the eventual articulation of the theory of quantum mechanics, one of physics’ most successful theories to
date.
One of the facts that drove the development of quantum mechanics was the appearance of the notion
of quantization in several physical contexts. Unification appears to have played a broadly justificatory
role insofar as quantum theory was supported by the fact that it could account for phenomena in different
domains.5 However, while such an account might function as a reconstruction of why elements of a
quantum theory were justified, in order to gain a better understanding of theory development, we must
also consider unification as it was operative historically. I claim that in that context, unification is best
considered a strategy for theory pursuit.
Although the idea of energy quantization was appealed to in several domains, these were not simply
applications of a single, unambiguous hypothesis: the tentative conjectures were based on quite different
assumptions about the physical reasons for quantization in each context. Indeed, it is more accurate to
characterize the scientists in question as appealing to various members of a family of quantum conjec-
tures, with the basic unifying hypothesis of energy quantization in the background guiding these appli-
cations. In what follows, I give a brief description of some uses of a quantization conjecture between
1900 and 1913, outlining the relevant differences, in order to show that the idea of quantization is best
characterized as a successful strategy for guiding work in which the goal was to develop a new theory that
could account for observed physical anomalies. For Einstein especially, this heuristic conception played
a central role in several theoretical advancements.
It was the investigation of blackbody radiation which first gave rise to the consideration of an explicit
quantum conjecture by Planck.6 In his description, Planck employed a model of a blackbody as a system
of Hertzian resonators — small, nonresistive, oscillating electric circuits. While most of the details are
not important here, we can describe a major part of Planck’s task as determining the relation between the
mean energy and entropy of a single resonator in the system. To do this, he considered a large number
N of identical resonators, and took the total entropy of the resonators SN to be k logW + const, in
analogy to the entropy found in kinetic gas theory. In order to find a value for W , the probability that
the system of resonators possesses energy UN , Planck assumed that the energy can be considered in
portions of yet undetermined size . Rather than simply taking the limit as → 0 as one would expect for
continuous amounts of energy, he used this discretized consideration of the energy UN to calculate the
number of ways the energy elements could be divided between the N resonators, thus yielding a value
5 See Kao (2015) for a reconstruction of such an argument.
6 This refers to the spectrum of radiation emitted by an ideal body that perfectly absorbs, then re-emits all radiation incident
upon it.
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for W . Further calculations yielded the result that  must be proportional to frequency ν, and Planck
introduced the constant h to express that proportionality as  = hν.
Based on various presentations of his idea of quantization (Planck 1901, 1900), it is possible to at-
tribute two different quantum conjectures to Planck. It is not clear which of these Planck was genuinely
committed to, if he indeed had a single conjecture in mind. Both conjectures arise from an interpretation
of the “energy element”  = hν, and what it might mean for energy of frequency ν to be considered in
amounts of .
One way to read Planck’s quantization condition is to attribute the discontinuous nature of energy
to the behaviour of the resonators modeling the blackbody. In this case, one assumes only that we must
describe the energy that a single resonator possesses in integral multiples of hν. This is how historians
such as Klein have read Planck, who says for instance “Planck had quantized only the energy of the
material oscillators and not the radiation” (Klein, 1961, p. 477). This particular quantum conjecture is
thus that an oscillator of frequency ν can only emit energy in integral amounts hν, despite the fact that
we would have previously assumed that there was no discrete restriction on this quantity.
An alternative reading of Planck’s quantum conjecture is that he was specifically imposing a quan-
tization condition on the phase space of a resonator when calculating its entropy. Planck himself, when
discussing the ratio P that results from dividing the total energy E of the system by the number of energy
elements, says “If the ratio is not an integer, we take for P an integer in the neighbourhood (Planck,
1900/1967, 84).” The inclusion of the caveat, “in case P is not an integer,” seems to indicate that he
considers the possibility that the energy elements are merely a convenient calculational device, and do
not reflect a physical fact. Thomas Kuhn is one person who has has argued for this kind of interpretation,
where it is not clear what physical significance we should attribute to this specific partition of phase space
(Kuhn 1978).7 Regardless of which conjecture Planck was actually committed to, the idea of quantizing
a quantity which had always previously been considered to be continuous with the parameter h was used
exclusively in a context considering the interaction between radiation and matter.
These two conjectures show that even the mere introduction of the idea of quantization was ambiguous
in terms of its physical interpretation. The lack of a definite interpretation at least suggests that this idea
was guiding research rather than acting as a hypothesis that could be straightforwardly confirmed. In the
next quantum conjectures, we will see how the idea of quantization was applied beyond this context, by
acting as a unifying idea to guide research in different areas.
I will first discuss Einstein’s uses of the idea of quantization. The first such application appeared
in Einstein’s 1905 paper on light quanta, in which he suggested that the idea of quantization should
be applied to electromagnetic radiation itself rather than in the interaction of radiation with matter. He
presented the major assumption of this paper as follows:
According to the assumption considered here, when a light ray starting from a point is propagated,
the energy is not continuously distributed over an ever increasing volume, but it consists of a finite
number of energy quanta, localised in space, which move without being divided and which can be
absorbed or emitted only as a whole. (Einstein, 1905/1967, 92)
Einstein first showed that when assuming the validity of the equipartition theorem to describe the ve-
locities of the molecules, using Maxwell’s theory to analyse the energy of resonators and gas molecules in
a volume surrounded by reflecting walls leads to the prediction that the amount of radiation will continue
to grow with the frequency of radiation, a result we now refer to as the ultraviolet catastrophe. Einstein
saw the potential in Planck’s work for solving this problem, but provided a more rigorous underpinning
for the idea of quantization.
7 See also Darrigol (1992) for useful discussions.
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Einstein used this strategy once again in his work on the specific heat of diamond.8 At the time, the ob-
served value of this quantity was quite far from theoretical predictions. Einstein’s 1907 paper was the first
attempt at using a quantum conjecture in a context other than that of radiation phenomena. He proposed
that the idea that energy should be considered in quantized amounts be applied to the energy of atoms
of solids. Specifically, the energy of elementary structures could only assume the values 0, hν, 2hν, . . .,
where h is Planck’s constant and ν the frequency of the atom.9 This conjecture was thus not limited to the
context of radiation, but any elementary structure that could be modelled as an oscillator. In fact, in this
context, the energy of an oscillator has to do with its position and momentum, which seems prima facie
to be unrelated to the constitution of electromagnetic radiation. This application allowed him to calculate
a value for the specific heat which was much closer to the observed value. There are several features
of Einstein’s work in these two cases that indicate that he was not simply applying Planck’s quantiza-
tion conjecture, but was instead using the idea to guide his own pursuit of a theory that would explain
the observed anomalies in different domains. In other words, he was supposing that unification may be
operative, and employing it as a heuristic strategy.
For one thing, Einstein pointed out that certain of Planck’s assumptions in the derivation of his black-
body formula were questionable in terms of their consistency, so while he was influenced by Planck’s
work, it is not the case that he intended his own theorizing as a mere test or extension of the theory devel-
oped by Planck (Einstein, 1906/1989).10 However, Einstein did use his criticism of Planck’s assumptions
to point out the need for further investigation of certain concepts that Planck was using.
A related fact is that Einstein provided a different argument to justify the appeal to the idea of quanti-
zation. While Planck was representing a blackbody as a system of vibrating resonators that could absorb
and emit energy, Einstein considered a system with n moving points in a given volume, in analogy with
gaseous systems. Planck’s appeal to Boltzmann’s work in the kinetic theory of gases seemed to stem pri-
marily from its mathematical expediency in leading to the correct radiation formula; Einstein’s analogy
with kinetic theory was carefully formulated so that although its applicability was limited only to domains
of low-density radiation, the argument was much better grounded than Planck’s.11
Finally, the differences in the domains of applicability accentuate the idea of using a unifying heuristic
to guide research. Einstein’s formulation of the conjecture is applicable to phenomena that Planck never
considered, such as the phenomenon of fluorescence, the ionisation of gases, and the photoelectric effect.
This is true despite the fact that nothing in Planck’s discussions of blackbody radiation indicate that his
conjecture of quantized energy was meant to be exported to other domains.
The final successful quantum conjecture I will address comes out of Niels Bohr’s work on the model
of the hydrogen atom.12 Bohr motivated his 1913 paper by noting that certain experimental results on
α-ray scattering seemed to support Rutherford’s atomic model, but that this model comes up against
conceptual and theoretical problems not encountered in alternative atomic models. One important issue
was that Rutherford’s model required the existence of stable states that cannot be determined based on
classical electrodynamics. Furthermore, the quantities present in the Rutherford model did not provide
enough information to determine a characteristic length for the radius of the atom. Bohr noted that the
introduction of h, Planck’s constant, provides this information, since its units and dimensions made it
possible to calculate the length of the atom which turned out to be of the expected order of magnitude
based on other experiments. Using his version of a quantum conjecture, along with his elementary atomic
8 The specific heat of a substance refers to the amount of heat required to raise a certain quantity of that substance by one degree
Kelvin.
9 Einstein used a different notation which was equivalent to expressing quantities in terms of h.
10 The inconsistency arises from the two different ways Planck used to calculate the equilibrium entropy of a blackbody. The first
assumes that the energy of the resonator takes on integral multiples of an undetermined amount . The other relies on a calculation
using Maxwell’s theory of electricity, which are expressions of periodic functions that do not restrict their possible values to discrete
ones.
11 See Norton (2006) for a reconstruction of the reasoning.
12 See Heilbron and Kuhn (1969) for a detailed treatment of this episode.
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model, Bohr was able to account for the Balmer formula, which describes the discrete spectral lines
observed when hydrogen gas is heated.
Although Bohr explicitly referenced Planck’s quantization conjecture, Bohr’s interpretation of quan-
tization is a novel one. Several quotes from Bohr emphasize this fact. For instance,
It is readily seen that there can be no question of a direct application of Planck’s theory. This
theory is concerned with the emission and absorption of energy in a system of electrical particles,
which oscillate with a given frequency per second, dependent only on the nature of the system
and independent of the amount of energy contained in the system. (Bohr, 1922, 10)
This is in contrast to an atomic system, where the frequency depends on the energy of the system.
Therefore, despite the reference to the emission of discrete amounts of energy, this was not a straight-
forward application of Planck’s idea. Therefore, we see that Bohr, like Einstein, was using a unifying
strategy to further pursue his inquiries in the domain of atomic structure. Again, the value of unification
is as a heuristic rather than as a feature that justified the hypothesis.
3 Discussion and implications
3.1 A heuristic strategy
In the previous section, I gave a brief overview of how the idea of quantization was acting as a unifying
idea that scientists such as Planck, Einstein, and Bohr used to pursue work in different domains of physics.
In this section, I will discuss the significance of recognizing that unification guides theory pursuit rather
than simply contributes to the support for a theory.
The first point is simply that this provides an accurate description of one element in the process of
scientific theory development during a crucial historical episode. It makes sense of the role that unifica-
tion played in scientists’ reasoning at the time, namely as a strategy for approaching various empirical
problems. We saw that by employing such a strategy, both Einstein and Bohr were able to account for
phenomena that previously had no explanation in certain domains, despite the fact that there was no
overarching consistent theory that scientists were trying to apply in different contexts. This heuristic at-
titude is displayed in the final section of Einstein’s (1909), where he sketches a possible interpretation
of the meaning of light quanta in which the energy of the electromagnetic field is localized in singular
points. After this description, he goes on to say, “I am sure it need not be particularly emphasized that
no importance should be attached to such a picture as long as it has not led to an exact theory” (Einstein,
1909/1989, 394).
Indeed, it does not even seem to be the case that finding an overarching theory was the primary mo-
tivation for work in the various domains. While this might be relatively self-evident, it is worth noting
that this is the opposite of what we might think would be the case if the goal were, for instance, to find
unifying theories because unifying explanations are a crucial characteristic of theories. Instead, it seemed
that the primary motivation was to solve existing problems in each scientific domain. Scientists accom-
plished this by using the idea of quantization as a heuristic tool to account for problematic phenomena.
Thus, during this early stage of theory development, Bohr, for instance, did not claim that the feature of
unification made the idea of quantization more plausible; instead, he used the idea in a unifying way as
a strategy for developing a new theory of the hydrogen atom. By turning our attention from the justifi-
catory aspect of unification, we obtain a better understanding of the process of theory development. The
historical analysis thus contributes to the characterization of successful reasoning patterns that occur in
such early stages.
Perhaps more importantly for our purposes, this historical example can help us to understand the way
in which unification, understood as a heuristic strategy, can contribute directly to the development of a
8 Molly Kao
theory. In our particular case, we can see how such a strategy helped determine both the scope and the
content of an eventual quantum theory.
My focus will be on the former, but I will provide a brief example of how a unifying strategy helps
to determine the content of a quantum theory. I refer to the fact that the experiments that were performed
in each of the different domains can be interpreted as contributing to the determination of the value of
Planck’s constant, which is a crucial part of the theory of quantum mechanics that was subsequently de-
veloped.13 The basic idea is that the numerical value of a theoretical parameter is an important element
of a theory, and by drawing on the fact that experiments in different domains provided multiple measure-
ments of Planck’s constant we see how part of the quantum theory was determined in this way. While
the notion of agreeing measurements is hardly novel, I would emphasize here that the determination of
the value of Planck’s constant was not simply a confirmational exercise, but an actual contribution to
the content of quantum theory, broadly speaking. Thus, we can see the importance of using a strategy
of unification for the articulation of a theory, apart from the contribution of that particular feature to the
resulting theory’s evidential support.
Equally important in the context of pursuing a new theory is that of determining its scope, where I
use this word to refer to the theory’s domain of applicability. One of the questions that should naturally
arise in the introduction of a quantization parameter is whether it is simply a feature of the particular
system under study, such as the interaction between matter and radiation in Planck’s work, or whether it
is a result of a more general condition. Any individual application of the idea of quantization could be
considered merely as a way of trying to recover the observations of the phenomenon in question. This is
demonstrated by the fact that quantization itself could be attributed to various possible physical causes.
Indeed, we can understand Planck’s original introduction of the idea in just these terms.
However, the success of using a quantum postulate in such a wide range of domains showed that there
must be something about the underlying description of the systems that was common. After all, it might
have been possible to account for the spectrum of blackbody radiation in terms of some mechanism in
a resonator that would render its emission of electromagnetic radiation a discrete process. Nevertheless,
such a mechanism would be specific to the situation, in which energy is directly related to the frequency
of electromagnetic radiation. Such a mechanism would not be applicable in the context of an oscilla-
tor whose energy depends on position and momentum, such as those used to model a diamond. The
increasingly broad applicability of the notion of quantization began to reduce the probability that previ-
ous continuous descriptions of quantities could be wholly accurate. Thus, the fact that quantization was
applicable in these disparate contexts allowed scientists to eliminate the possibility that certain specific
physical causes were responsible for the observed behaviour. The ‘indefinite’ nature of the postulate is
thus actually an indication of how universal it is, and this universality made it increasingly clear that some
fundamental aspect of previous descriptions of physical systems had to change. These results provided
evidence that any future theory must address not only any particular dynamical aspects of physical setups,
but the fundamental kinematical descriptions of systems at very small scales.
The idea that using unification as a heuristic strategy contributes to the development of a theory differs
from the judgement that unifying hypotheses are better supported than non-unifying hypotheses. It also
differs from the project of evaluating a theory as an explanation of all the given phenomena, though I
certainly would not deny that this can often be valuable. Again, the crucial issue here is not how diverse
various sources of evidence for a given hypothesis happen to be, but rather the value for the theory itself in
employing such a strategy. The assumption is not that unification per se is good; instead, the observation
is that the adoption of unification as a heuristic is a good strategy for making progress on a theory.
One might be tempted to say that using a unifying strategy is useful simply because of its possible
fruitfulness, that is, its potential ability to successfully solve problems in different domains. Indeed, it is
doubtful that anyone would deny that this is a crucial element of theory development. However, I claim
13 See Kao (2015) for discussion of this idea.
Unification beyond justification: a strategy for theory development 9
that it is also important to identify a related but different result: such an account brings out the importance
of applying a unifying hypothesis in ultimately unsuccessful contexts. For instance, consider the following
work by Arnold Sommerfeld, a prominent contributor to the development of quantum theory. He noted
in his report at the first Solvay Congress that the crucial parameter h was a quantum of action, not of
energy. He thus hypothesized that a quantum condition should be imposed not on energy itself, such as
in Einstein’s suggestion of light quanta, but on the processes governing energy changes over time in a
given process.14 This led him to formulate a quantum postulate in terms of the Lagrangian of a system,∫ τ
0
Ldt = h/2pi, whereL is the Lagrangian (kinetic minus potential energy), and τ represents the duration
of the process involving an energy exchange (1912, 316). He and Peter Debye later used this postulate
to predict a relation between τ and E, the electric amplitude, in the context of radiation absorption and
emission (1913). However, no such relation was found between these two quantities.
If we focus on how quantum theory was being developed, we can see that such an attempt at applying
the postulate actually helped to delimit its scope. Namely, the failure of this application pointed to the
idea that quantization was not necessarily related to the dynamical process of energy exchange between
radiation and matter. On the other hand, if we focus on unification solely in terms of its contribution to
justification, it is difficult to account for the value of such unsuccessful applications of unifying ideas,
since they are essentially irrelevant to the support for a theory. Of course, one might reply that if such a
prediction had been borne out, this would have provided some reason to think that more applications of
quantization might be found in the examination of dynamical processes, and so the value of this line of
inquiry still lies in its potential contribution. However, I would argue that it is more accurate to recognize
the positive value of the negative result: by combining it with successful results such as the quantization of
the phase space of an oscillator, it became increasingly clear that quantization should apply to descriptions
of systems rather than temporal processes.
3.2 Relation to robustness reasoning
The focus on unification as a heuristic strategy parallels certain elements of a related type of reasoning,
namely that found in robustness analysis. While there are several ways of describing robustness reason-
ing, we may express the common thread as follows: a hypothesis is deemed more plausible due to the
fact that it is supported by multiple lines of argument (where “hypothesis” may refer to a prediction, a
description of a system, or another aspect of a theory). Such hypotheses might include statements about
particular theoretical parameters supported by agreeing measurements in diverse experiments, the exis-
tence of a general phenomenon that may manifest in several different target systems, or predictions about
a specific system that is being represented by multiple models.15 First, it is worth being explicit about
how unification as described in this paper differs from robustness analysis. While the former is meant to
be a strategy that guides the articulation of a hypothesis that ultimately connects multiple domains, the
latter is focused on the way in which multiple lines of argument support a given hypothesis. Nevertheless,
the two share some interesting common features.
One such feature is simply their focus on the process of developing a theory rather than evaluating it.
For instance, Trizio (2012) and Nederbragt (2012) both describe the role of robustness analysis in cases
of ongoing research; Trizio by describing a particular case where robust results are an explicit goal when
conducting experiments, and Nederbragt by describing how robustness reasoning can be used to confirm
results of local hypotheses within broader theories. Both of these discussions are firmly situated within the
14 “Nous ferons, par suite, l’hypothe`se suivante. Les proprie´te´s ge´ne´rales de toutes les mole´cules ou atomes qui de´terminent les
phe´nome`nes de rayonnement ne consistent pas dans l’intervention d’e´le´ments particuliers d’e´nergie, mais en ceci, que la manie`re
dont se produisent les e´changes d’e´nergie dans un temps plus ou moins long est domine´e par une loi universelle” (Sommerfeld,
1912, 314).
15 See Schickore and Coko (2013) for an overview and further references.
10 Molly Kao
context of articulating a theory rather than evaluating a result. Weisberg (2006) emphasizes a similar point
in his discussion of robustness analysis in the context of phenomena studied by population biologists. He
characterizes robustness analysis as a process by which scientists can identify robust features and robust
theorems. In other words, it is a method of analysis that can help to actually articulate a hypothesis or
theory.
Weisberg also contrasts the types of systems he is discussing — primarily those studied by population
biologists — with physical systems described by fundamental physical theories. He points out that in
the latter, the effect of certain idealizations found in a model of the system can be estimated, whereas
“in the study of many complex systems, . . . such a theory is unavailable” (2006, 713). While it is clear
that Weisberg is referring to relatively simple examples such as the analysis of a mass sliding down an
inclined plane, it is worth noting that at the stage of developing fundamental physical theories, the same
problems are inherent, and an analogous strategy needs to be employed.
The foregoing discussion might lead one to question the wisdom or utility of taking unification to
be a heuristic strategy. After all, one might think that doing so requires either that we have a preexisting
commitment to the unity of science, or that we have some reason to think that unified theories are more
likely to be true. Indeed, Weisberg himself argues that theorems arrived at through robustness analysis
are more likely to be true. I will treat these two considerations in turn.
First, I will address the idea that considering unification to be a useful heuristic strategy presupposes
that science is an essentially unifying enterprise. Of course, the “unity of science” thesis has been dis-
cussed extensively in philosophy, and it is not the goal of this paper to argue either for or against such a
thesis. Instead, I will note that by focusing on the process of developing a theory, we need not be com-
mitted to the idea that the final theory will definitely unify all of the phenomena being investigated; a
perfectly legitimate outcome of using a unifying heuristic is a result in which one concludes that there is
no unifying element between multiple phenomena. In such a case, knowledge is gained about the domain
of applicability of a hypothesis. Furthermore, I take it to be an asset of this account that developed theories
may be unifying in different ways. While I have discussed this case in the context of early quantum the-
ory in which multiple domains were unified by their incorporation of a quantization parameter into their
physical description, there exist a multitude of ways of following such a strategy. For instance, Myrvold
(2017) and Nathan (2017) provide different interpretations of unification. Furthermore, Morrison (2000)
argues by examining several historical cases that there is no unified account of theoretical unification.16
This is not problematic; it simply indicates that the application of unification as a heuristic strategy will
likely be different in different disciplines.
The second point expresses the concern that the characterization of unification as a heuristic strategy
is parasitic on the notion of justification. In other words, perhaps unification is only useful as a guiding
strategy for theory pursuit because such hypotheses are subsequently better supported by the evidence,
where such support can be understood in different ways. Thus, the claim that we should understand
unification as a heuristic strategy does not add much to our understanding. However, such a claim is
rather beside the point. I certainly do not deny the value of analyses of how the feature of unification
provides support for a given theory. Indeed, I accept the idea that unification contributes to the support
for a theory in many cases. Despite this fact, considering unification in a heuristic context allows us to
see how such a strategy contributes directly to the articulation of a newly developing theory by helping to
determine its content and scope. This is true even apart from the support the resulting theory may receive
from multiple contexts, since the unification contributes to the construction of the hypothesis itself.
Indeed, we see that this aspect of unification plays a role prior to the analysis of the support it provides
for a hypothesis, insofar as it is a strategy that can be used to help construct a theory before we reach
the point of evaluating that theory in terms of it or by other means. We need not think that the theory
that applies to more phenomena is more likely to be true; we simply recognise that in order to arrive
16 She also provides a thorough argument decoupling unification from both truth and explanation.
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at a theory, we must adopt certain strategies. Given the case of the quantum postulate, we saw that the
strategy of considering the quantum postulate to be possibly applicable in multiple contexts helped to
actually constrain how the postulate should be understood, and was thus crucial for the development of
a further quantum theory. By focusing solely on unification in the logical context of justifying a theory,
we ignore a crucial element of the developmental process. An understanding of unification in this context
provides a fuller picture of scientific practice.
4 Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that we must consider the role of the theoretical feature of unification in the
context of developing a theory, and not only in the context of providing support for that theory. I have
argued that unification can act as a general heuristic strategy when developing a new theory, and supported
this characterization by showing how such a strategy was operative in the early stages of the development
of quantum theory. This characterization is distinct from many current discussions of unification since
the emphasis is on how it can contribute to the preliminary articulation of a theory.
This conception has several favourable features. First, it provides what I claim is a faithful description
of one of the ways scientists do in fact approach certain problems in science. Second, I have argued that
such an analysis allows us to better understand how a theory is developed by determining the domain
of applicability of certain hypotheses. Furthermore, this analysis provides an account of the positive
contribution of failed lines of research, whose value is not evident when discussing unification in the
context of evidential support. While this is not an argument against the value of these other conceptions
of unification, it is meant to draw attention to the fact that we cannot ignore the heuristic role if we wish
to properly describe and understand how certain theories are developed.
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